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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the rational synthesis problem for concurrent game structures for a
variety of objectives ranging from reachability to Muller condition. We propose a new algorithm
that establishes the decidability of the non cooperative rational synthesis problem that relies solely
on game theoretic techniques as opposed to previous approaches that are logic based. Given an
instance of the rational synthesis problem, we construct a zero-sum turn-based game that can be
adapted to each one of the class of objectives. We obtain new complexity results. In particular,
we show that in the cases of reachability, safety, Büchi, and co-Büchi objectives the problem
is in PSpace, providing a tight upper-bound to the PSpace-hardness already established for
turn-based games. In the case of Muller objective the problem is in ExpTime. We also obtain
positive results when we assume a fixed number of agents, in which case the problem falls into
PTime for reachability, safety, Büchi, and co-Büchi objectives.
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1 Introduction
The synthesis problem aims at automatically designing a program from a given specification.
Several applications for this formal problem can be found in the design of interactive systems
i.e., systems interacting with an environment. From a formal point of view, the synthesis
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problem is traditionally modelled as a zero-sum turn-based game. The system and the
environment are modeled by two players with opposite interest. The goal of the system is the
desired specification. Hence, a strategy that allows the system to achieve its goal against any
behavior of the environment is a winning strategy and is exactly the program to synthesize.
For a time, the described approach was the standard in the realm of controller synthesis.
However, due to the variety of systems to model, such a pessimistic view is not always the
most faithful one. For instance, consider a system that consists of a server and n clients.
Assuming that all the agents have opposite interests is not a realistic assumption. Indeed,
from a design perspective, the purpose of the server is to handle the incoming requests. On
the other hand, each client is only concerned with its own request and wants it granted.
None of the agents involved in the described interaction have antagonistic purposes. The
setting of non-zero-sum games was proposed as model with more realistic assumptions.
In a non zero-sum game, each agent is equipped with a personal objective and the system
is just a regular agent in the game. The agents interact together aiming at achieving the
best outcome. The best outcome in this setting is often formalized by the concept of Nash
equilibria. Unfortunately, a solution in this setting offers no guarantee that a specification
for a given agent is achieved, and in a synthesis context one wants to enforce a specification
for one or a subset of the agents.
The rational synthesis problem was introduced as a generalization of the synthesis problem
to environment with multiple agents [4]. It aims at synthesizing a Nash equilibrium such
that the induced behavior satisfies a given specification. This vision enjoys nice algorithmic
properties since it matches the complexity bound of the classical synthesis problem. Later
on, yet another version of the problem was proposed where the agents are rational but not
cooperative [6, 7]. In the former formalization, the specification is guaranteed as long as the
agents agree to behave according to the chosen equilibrium. But anything can happen if
not, in particular they can play another equilibrium that does not satisfy the specification.
In the Non Cooperative Rational Synthesis (NCRSP), the system has to ensure that the
specification holds in any equilibrium (c.f., Section 3 for a formal definition and Figure 1a
for an example). A solution for both problems was presented for specifications expressed in
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL). The proposed solution relies on the fact that the problem can
be expressed in a decidable fragment of a logic called Strategy Logic. The presented algorithm
runs in 2-ExpTime. While expressing the problem in a decidable fragment of Strategy Logic
gives an immediate solution, it could also hide a great deal of structural properties. Such
properties could be exploited in a hope of designing faster algorithms for less expressive
objectives. In particular, specifications such as reachability, liveness, fairness, etc.
In [3], the first author took part in a piece of work where they considered this very problem
for specific objectives such as reachability, safety, Büchi, etc in a turn-based interaction
model. They established complexity bounds for each objective.
In this paper we consider the problem of non-cooperative rational synthesis with concurrent
interactions. We address this problem for a variety of objectives and give exact complexity
bounds relying exclusively on techniques inspired by the theory of zero-sum games. The
concurrency between agents raises a formal challenge to overcome as the techniques used in [3]
do not directly extend. Intuitively, when the interaction is turn-based, one can construct a
tree automaton that accepts solutions for the rational synthesis problem. The nodes of an
accepted tree are exactly the vertices of the game. This helps a lot in dealing with deviations
but cannot be used in concurrent games.
In Section 3, we present an alternative algorithm that solves the general problem for LTL
specification. This algorithm constructs a zero-sum turn-based game. This fresh game is
played between Constructor who tries to construct a solution and Spoiler who tries to falsify
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the proposed solution. We then show in Section 5 how to use this algorithm to solve the
NCRSP for reachability, safety, Büchi, co-Büchi, and Muller conditions. We also observe
that we match the complexity results for the NCRSP in turn-based games.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Concurrent Game Structures
I Definition 1. A game structure is defined as a tuple G = (St, s0,Agt, (Acti)i∈Agt,Tab),
where St is the set of states in the game, s0 is the initial state, Agt = {0, 1, ..., n} is the set
of agents, Acti is the set of actions of Agent i, Tab : St×
∏
i∈Agt Acti → St is the transition
table.
I Remark. Note that we consider game structures that are complete and deterministic. That
is, from each state s and any tuple of actions ā ∈
∏
i∈Agt Acti, there is exactly one successor
state s′.
I Definition 2. A play in the game structure is a sequence of states and actions profile
ρ = s0ā0s1ā1s2ā2... in (St
∏
i∈Agt Acti)ω such that s0 is the initial state and for all j ≥ 0,
sj+1 = Tab(sj , āj).
Throughout the paper, for every word w, over any alphabet, we denote by w[j] the
j + 1-th letter, and we denote by w[0..j] the prefix of w of size j + 1.
By ρ St we mean the projection of ρ over St, and Plays(G) is the set of all the plays in
the game structure G. We call history any finite sequence in St (
∏
i∈Agt Acti St)∗. For a
history h, we denote by h St its projection over St, and by LastSt(h) the last element of h St.
We denote by Hist the set of all the histories.
In this paper we allow agents to see the actions played between states. Therefore, they
behave depending on the past sequence of states and tuples of actions.
I Definition 3 (Strategy and strategy profile). A strategy for Agent i is a mapping σi :
St
(∏
i∈Agt Acti St
)∗
→ Acti .
A strategy profile is defined as a tuple of strategies σ̄ = 〈σ0, σ1, ..., σn〉 and by σ̄[i] we
denote the strategy of i-th position (of Agent i).
Also, σ̄−i is the partial strategy profile obtained from the strategy profile σ̄ from which
the strategy of Agent i is ignored. The tuple of strategies 〈σ̄−i, σ′i〉 is obtained from the tuple
σ̄ by substituting Agent i’s strategy with σ′i.
Once a strategy profile is chosen it induces a play ρ. We say that a play ρ = s0ā0s1ā1s2ā2...
in (St
∏
i∈Agt Acti)ω is compatible with a strategy σi of Agent i if for every prefix of ρ[0..2k]
with k ≥ 0, we have σ(ρ[0..2k]) = āk(i), where āk(i) is the action of Agent i in the vector āk.
We denote by Plays(σi) the set of all the plays that are compatible with the strategy σi
for Agent i. Hist(σi) is the set of all the histories that are compatible with σi. The outcome
of an interaction between agents following a certain strategy profile σ̄ defines a unique play
in the game structure G denoted Out(σ̄). It is the unique play in G compatible with all the
strategies in the profile σ̄ which is an infinite sequence over (St
∏
i∈Agt Acti).
2.2 Payoff and Solution Concepts
Each Agent i ∈ Agt has an objective expressed as a set Obji of infinite sequences of states in
G. As defined before, a play ρ is a sequence of states and action profiles. We slightly abuse
notation and also write ρ ∈ Obji, meaning that the sequence of states in the play ρ (that
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is, ρ St) is in Obji. We define the payoff function that associates with each play ρ a vector
Payoff(ρ) ∈ {0, 1}n+1 defined by
∀i ∈ Agt,Payoffi(ρ) = 1 ⇐⇒ ρ ∈ Obji .
We borrow game theoretic vocabulary and say that Agent i wins whenever her payoff is
1. We sometimes abuse this notation and write Payoffi(σ̄), which is the payoff of Agent i
associated with the unique play induced by σ̄.
In this paper we are interested in winning objectives such as Safety, Reachability, Büchi,
coBüchi, and Muller that are defined as follows. Let ρ be a play in a concurrent game
structure G. We use the following notations:
occ(ρ) = {s ∈ St | ∃j ≥ 0 s.t. ρ[j] = s}
to denote the set of states that appear along ρ and
inf(ρ) = {s ∈ St | ∀j ≥ 0,∃k ≥ j s.t. ρ[k] = s}
to denote the set of states appearing infinitely often along ρ. Then,
Reachability: For some T ⊆ St, Reach(T ) = {ρ ∈ Stω | occ(ρ) ∩ T 6= ∅};
Safety:For some T ⊆ St, Safe(T ) = {ρ ∈ Stω | occ(ρ) ⊆ T};
Büchi: For some T ⊆ St, Büchi(T ) = {ρ ∈ Stω | inf(ρ) ∩ T 6= ∅};
coBüchi: For some T ⊆ St, coBüchi(T ) = {ρ ∈ Stω | inf(ρ) ∩ T = ∅};
Parity: For some priority function p : St → N, Parity(p) = {ρ ∈ Stω | min{p(s) | s ∈
inf(ρ)} is even };
Muller: For some boolean formula µ over St, Muller(µ) = {ρ ∈ Stω | inf(ρ) |= µ}.
A Nash equilibrium is the formalisation of a situation where no agent can improve her payoff
by unilaterally changing her behaviour. Formally:
I Definition 4. (Nash equilibrium) A strategy profile σ̄ is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if for
every agent i and every strategy σ′ of i the following holds true:
Payoffi(σ̄) ≥ Payoffi(〈σ̄−i, σ′〉) .
Throughout this paper, we will assume that Agent 0 is the agent for whom we wish to
synthesize the strategy, therefore, we use the concept of 0-fixed Nash equilibria.
I Definition 5 (0-fixed Nash equilibrium). A profile 〈σ0, σ̄−0〉 is a 0-fixed NE (0-NE), if for
every strategy σ′ for agent i in Agt \ {0} the following holds true:
Payoffi(〈σ0, σ̄−0〉) ≥ Payoffi(〈σ0, (σ̄−0)−i, σ
′〉) .
That is, fixing σ0 for Agent 0, the other agents cannot improve their payoff by unilaterally
changing their strategy.
2.3 Rational synthesis
The rational synthesis can be defined in a optimistic or pessimistic setting. The former one
is the so-called Cooperative Rational Synthesis (CRSP) Formally defined as
I Problem 6. Is there a 0-NE σ̄ such that Payoff0(σ̄) = 1?
The latter is the so-called Non Cooperative Rational Synthesis Problem (NCRSP) and is
formally defined as
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s0
s1s2
T{0,1}T{2}
(l, ∗, ∗) (r, ∗, ∗)
(l, ∗, b)
(l, ∗, a)
(r, b, ∗)
(r, a, ∗)
(l, ∗, ∗)(r, ∗, ∗)
(a) A concurrent game.
s0
s1s2
T{0,1}T{2}
(r, ∗, ∗)
(l, ∗, b)
(l, ∗, a)
(r, b, ∗)
(r, a, ∗)
(b) Subgame induced from the strategy σ0.
Figure 1
I Problem 7. Is there a strategy σ0 for Agent 0 such that for every 0-NE σ̄ = 〈σ0, σ̄−0〉, we
have Payoff0(σ̄) = 1?
In this paper we study computational complexity for the rational synthesis problem in
both cooperative and non-cooperative settings.
For the CRSP, the complexity results are corollaries of existing work. In particular, for
Safety, Reachability, Büchi, co-Büchi, Rabin and Muller objectives, we can apply algorithms
from [2] to obtain the same complexities for CRSP as for the turn-based models when the
number of agents is not fixed. More precisely, in [2] the problem of finding NE in concurrent
games is tackled. In this problem one asks for the existence of NE whose payoff is between
two thresholds. Then, by choosing the lower thresholds to be such that only Agent 0 satisfies
her objective and the upper thresholds such that all agents win, we reduce to the cooperative
rational synthesis problem. Brenguier et al. [2] showed that the existence of constrained NE
in concurrent games can be solved in PTime for Büchi objectives, NP for Safety, Reachability
and coBüchi objectives, and PSpace for Muller objectives. All hardness results are inferred
directly from the hardness results in the turn-based setting. This is a consequence of the fact
that every turn-based game can be encoded as a concurrent game by allowing at each state
at most one agent to have non-vacuous choices. For Streett objectives, by reducing to [2] we
only obtain PSpace-easiness and the NP-hardness comes from the turn-based setting [3].
In the case of non-cooperative rational synthesis, we cannot directly apply the existing
results. However, we define an algorithm inspired from the suspect games [2]. The suspect
game was introduced to decide the existence of pure NE in concurrent games with ω-regular
objectives. We inspire ourselves from that approach and design a zero-sum game that
combines the behaviors of Agent 0 and an extra entity whose goal is to prove, when needed,
that the current play is not the outcome of a 0-NE. We also extend the idea in [3] that
consists roughly in keeping track of deviations. Recall that the non-cooperative rational
synthesis problem consists in designing a strategy σ0 for the protagonist (Agent 0 in our
case) such that her objective Obj0 is satisfied by all the plays that are outcomes of 0-NE
compatible with σ0. This is equivalent to finding a strategy σ0 for Agent 0 such that for any
play ρ compatible with it, either ρ satisfies Obj0, or there is no strategy profile σ̄ = 〈σ0, σ̄−0〉
that is a 0-NE whose outcome is ρ.
I Example 8. Consider the concurrent game with reachability objectives depicted in Figure 1a.
The game starts in the state s0. There are three agents, the controller Agent 0, Agent 1, and
Agent 2. Agent 0 has two actions r for right and l for left. Agents 1 and 2 have two actions,
denoted a and b. For any subset C of {0, 1, 2}, the states TC indicate that the agents in C
have reached their objectives (These states are sinks). In addition, there are three states s0,
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s1, and s2. The edges represent the transitions table. The labels indicate the action profiles
e.g. the vector (r, a, b) means that Agent 0 took action r, Agent 1 took action a, and Agent
2 took action b. Finally action ∗ stands for the indifferent choice that is any action for a
given agent. We can see that at s0, Agent 0 is the only agent with non-vacuous choices. He
can choose to go to s1 by playing action r, or to go to s2 by playing action l.
Now consider the strategy σ0 for Agent 0 defined as follows: σ0(s0) = r, σ0(s1) =
r, σ0(s2) = l We argue that this strategy is a solution to the NCRSP. Indeed, by applying
this strategy, we obtain the subgame of Figure 1b. In this game, all the plays falsifying the
objective of Agent 0 are the ones where Agent 1 plays b. Notice now that these plays are not
outcomes of a 0-NE since Agent 1 can deviate by playing action a.
3 Solution for Problem 6
We will now describe a general algorithm that solves the NCRSP. As a first step in our
procedure, we construct a two-player turn based game.
3.1 Construction of a two-player game
Given a concurrent game G = (St, s0,Agt, (Acti)i∈Agt,Tab) we construct a turn-based 2-player
zero-sum game H = (Q, q0,ActE ,ActA,Tab′,Obj).
The game H is obtained as follows:
q0 = (s0, ∅, ∅)
The set ActE is ActaE ∪ Act
c
E where:
ActaE = Act0 ×
∏n
i=1(Acti ∪ {−})
ActcE =
∏n
i=1(Acti ∪ {−}).
The set ActA is
∏n
i=1 Acti.
The set Q of states is QA ∪QB ∪QC ∪QD where
QA = St× 2Agt × 2Agt
QB = St× 2Agt × 2Agt × ActaE
QC = St× 2Agt × 2Agt × ActaE × ActA
QD = St× 2Agt × 2Agt × ActaE × ActA × Act
c
E .
Player Eve plays in the states in QA and QC, while Player Adam plays in the states in
QB and QD. The legal moves are given as follows:
From a state (s,W,D) ∈ QA, Eve plays an action
ā ∈ Act0 ×
n∏
i=1
(Acti ∪ {−}) s.t. ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, ā[i] = − ⇐⇒ i 6∈W .
From a state (s,W,D, ā) ∈ QB, Adam plays an action b̄ ∈ ActA.
From a state (s,W,D, ā, b̄) ∈ QC, Eve plays an action
c̄ ∈
n∏
i=1
(Acti ∪ {−}) s.t. i ∈W ∪D =⇒ c̄[i] = − .
From a state (s,W,D, ā, b̄, c̄) ∈ QD, Adam plays an action d̄ ∈ ActA.
The transition Tab′ and the objective Obj of the game H are described next.
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3.2 Transition function
The game H is best understood as a dialogue between Eve and Adam. In each state (s,W,D)
Eve proposes an action for Agent 0 together with the actions corresponding to the winning
strategies of the agents in the set W . Then, Adam responds with an action profile played by
all agents in the environment. In the next step, Eve knows the entire action profile played by
the agents and proposes some new deviations for the agents that do not have a deviation
yet (they are neither in W nor in D). The last move is performed by Adam, it is his role to
“check” that the proposed deviations and winning strategies are correct. Therefore, Adam
can choose any continuation for the game and the sets W and D are updated according to
the previous choices to some new values W ′ and D′. Each dialogue “round” is decomposed
into four moves.
The transitions are given by the (partial) function Tab′ : Q× (ActE ∪ ActA)→ Q:
When (s,W,D) ∈ QA, Tab′((s,W,D), ā) = (s,W,D, ā).
When (s,W,D, ā) ∈ QB, Tab′((s,W,D, ā), b̄) = (s,W,D, ā, b̄).
When (s,W,D, ā, b̄) ∈ QC, Tab′((s,W,D, ā, b̄), c̄) = (s,W,D, ā, b̄, c̄).
When (s,W,D, ā, b̄, c̄) ∈ QD, Tab′((s,W,D, ā, b̄, c̄), d̄) = (s′,W ′, D′), such that:
s′ = Tab(s, (ā[0], d̄)).
W ′ = W ∪
{
i 6∈W ∪D | (d̄[i] = c̄[i]) and (∀j ∈ Agt \ {0, i}, d̄[j] = b̄[j])
}
\
{
i ∈W | d̄[i] 6= ā[i]
}
. That is, Agent i is added to the set W ′ on the continuations
where Agent i plays the new action proposed by Eve in ā (supposedly compatible with
a winning strategy) and the other agents do not change their actions with respect to
d̄. Also, any agent for whom Eve proposes an action in c̄ is a hint to Adam that this
agent can deviate from that point. It is up to Adam to agree or not. If Adam agrees,
we say that he has agreed with the recommendation of Eve. In this case, Eve has to
prove that she made the right choice, this will be checked by the winning condition of
the game.
D′ = D ∪ {i ∈W | d̄[i] 6= ā[i]}
∪
{
i 6∈W ∪D | (c̄[i] 6= −) and (d̄[i] 6= c̄[i]) and (∀j ∈ Agt \ {0, i}, d̄[j] = b̄[j])}
}
. This
is the opposite case where Adam stood by his choices, in this case the winning condition
has to check that this was a wrong decision.
3.3 Winning condition
We equip Q with the canonical projection πi that is the projection over the i-th component.
In particular, for every (s,W,D) ∈ QA, we have π1((s,W,D)) = s, π2((s,W,D)) = W , and
π3((s,W,D)) = W . We also extend πi over Q+ and Qω as expected. Histories for Eve are
finite words in q0(ActEQActAQ)∗. Histories for Adam are finite words in q0(ActEQ)∗. Plays
are infinite sequence in q0(ActEQActAQ)ω. Let r be a play, we denote r QA the restriction
of r over the states in QA which is an infinite sequence in QAω. The set lim π2(r QA) (resp.
lim π3(r QA)) is the set of agents in the limit of W ’s (resp. D’s). The limit lim π3(r QA)
exists because the sets D occurring in the states Q along a play are non-decreasing subsets
of Agt, and Agt is finite. The limit lim π2(r QA) exists because (1) an agent is added into
W only if it is not in D, and (2) when an agent leaves W , it gets into D indefinitely. This
means that when an agent leaves from W , it never goes back.
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We define the following sets:
S0 = {r ∈ Qω | π1(r QA) ∈ Obj0} , (1)
SW = {r ∈ Qω | ∀i ∈ lim π2(r QA), π1(r  QA) ∈ Obji} , (2)
SD = {r ∈ Qω | ∃i ∈ lim π3(r QA), π1(r  QA) 6∈ Obji} . (3)
Obj = (S0 ∪ SD) ∩ SW .
3.4 Transformations
Lifting of histories
We define a transformation over histories in G to create histories in H. For every strategy σ
for Eve in H, we define the transformation G2Hσ.
Let h be a history in G and assume that h = s0m̄0s1m̄1...skm̄ksk+1. The lifting of h is a
history h̃ in H obtained by the mapping G2Hσ inductively defined as follows:
G2Hσ(s0) = (s0, ∅, ∅) ,
and
G2Hσ(h) = G2Hσ(s0m̄0s1m̄1...sk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
h̃′
āqbb̄qcc̄qdd̄qa ,
where
ā = σ(h̃′) , qb = Tab′(Last(h̃′), ā) ,
b̄ = m̄k−0 , qc = Tab
′(qb, b̄) ,
c̄ = σ(h̃′āqbb̄qc) , qd = Tab′(qc, c̄) ,
d̄ = b̄ = m̄k−0 , qa = Tab
′(qd, d̄) .
Observe that every history G2Hσ(h) ends in a state in QA, where Eve plays an action from
ActaE , that always specifies an action for Agent 0. The function G2Hσ is thus instrumental
in obtaining a strategy σ0 for Agent 0 in G from a strategy of Player Eve in H. For every
history h in G, we define:
σ0(h) = σ(G2Hσ(h))[0] . (4)
For every strategy σ of Eve, we call 0-strategy the strategy obtained by Equation 4. The
following claim is consequence of the same equation.
I Claim 9. Let σ be a strategy for Eve, and let σ0 be the 0-strategy. If a history h in G is
compatible with σ0 then the history h̃ = G2Hσ(h) in H is compatible with σ.
The function G2Hσ maps every history in G into a history in H. We define G2H•σ as the
natural extension of G2Hσ over the domain of plays in G. We extend the previous claim as
expected.
I Claim 10. Let σ be a strategy for Eve, and let σ0 be the 0-strategy. If a run ρ in G is
compatible with σ0 then the run r = G2H•σ(ρ) in H is compatible with σ.
I Lemma 11. Let σ be a strategy for Eve, let ρ be a run in G compatible with the 0-strategy σ0.
Let h be a history in G, assume h to be a prefix of ρ. If h̃ = G2Hσ(h) then π1(h̃ QA) = h St.
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Proof. By induction on the size of h. The base case is h = s0, in which case G2Hσ(h) = h̃ =
(s0, ∅, ∅). We have π1(h̃ QA) = s0 = h St. Now assume for induction that π1(h̃ QA) = h St
for every history h = s0m̄0s1m̄1...sk of size 1 + 2k and let G2Hσ(h) = h̃.
Now consider the history hmksk+1 by definition G2Hσ(hmksk+1) = h̃āqbb̄qcc̄qdd̄qa where
ā, b̄, c̄, d̄ are obtained thanks to G2Hσ, by I.H. π1(h̃) = s0s1...sk, it thus suffices to show that
π1(qa) = sk+1. For this, one needs to remark that mk = (σ(h̃)[0], d̄), and that
sk+1 = Tab(sk,mk) = π1(Tab′((s,W,D, ā, b̄, c̄), d̄)) = π1(qa)
where the second equality is by definition of the construction. J
Since the previous lemma is true for any histories that are respectively prefixes of r and
ρ we obtain the following claim:
I Claim 12. Let σ be a strategy for Eve, let ρ be a run in G compatible with the 0-strategy
σ0. If r = G2H•σ(ρ) then π1(r QA) = ρ St.
Projection of histories
We now define in some sense the reverse operation. Let us define the transformation H2G.
Let h̃ be a history in H ending in a state in QA.
H2G(q0) = s0
H2G(h̃āqbb̄qcc̄qdd̄qa) = H2G(h̃)︸ ︷︷ ︸
induction
(ā[0], d̄−0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
action
qa
I Lemma 13. Let h̃ be a run in H, h be a history in G. If h = H2G(h̃), then π1(h̃ QA) = h St
Proof. By induction over the length of h̃. For h̃ = (s0, ∅, ∅) the result trivially true. Assume
the result holds for any history h̃ and let us show that it holds for h̃āqbb̄qcc̄qdd̄qa. By
induction we have π1(h̃ QA) = h St, to conclude notice that
π1(qa) = Tab(Last(H2G(h̃)), (ā[0], d̄−0)) J
The function H2G maps every history in H ending in a state in QA into a history in G.
We define H2G• as the natural extension of H2G over the domain of runs in H.
The following claim follows
I Claim 14. Let r be a run in H, ρ be a run in G. If ρ = H2G•(r), then π1(r QA) = ρ St
4 Main Theorem
I Theorem 15. There exists a solution for the NCRSP iff Eve wins.
We denote σhi the strategy that mimics the strategy σi when the current history is h i.e.
σhi (h′) =

σi(h′) if h′ is a prefix of h
σi(h · h′) if h is a prefix of h′
⊥ otherwise
I Definition 16. Let ρ be a play and let h = s0ā0s1ā1 · · · skāksk+1 be a prefix of ρ. We say
that h is a good deviation point for Agent i ∈ Agt \ {0} if:
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ρ St 6∈ Obji and,
there exists a strategy σ′i of Agent i from [h] such that for all (σj)j∈Agt\{0,i} we have:
[h] · Out
(
σ
[h]
0 , ..., σ
′
i, ..., σ
[h]
n
)
∈ Obji , where
[h] = ρ[0..k] · 〈āk−i, σ′i(ρ[0..k])〉 · Tab
(
sk, 〈āk−i, σ′i(ρ[0..k])〉
)
.
We say that ρ has a good deviation if some prefix h of ρ is a good deviation point.
We use the notion of deviation point in the following lemma. This lemma states that a
strategy σ0 is a solution for the NCRSP if any play ρ compatible with it, either is winning
for Agent 0 or some Agent i would unilaterally deviate and win against any strategy profile
of the other agents.
I Lemma 17. A strategy σ0 is a solution for NCRSP iff every play ρ compatible with σ0
either ρ St∈ Obj0 or, ρ has a good deviation.
Proof. We start by establishing the if direction, let σ0 be a solution for the NCRSP. If any
outcome ρ ∈ Plays(σ0) is such that ρ St∈ Obj0 then there is nothing to prove. Let ρ be a
play in Plays(σ0) such that ρ is not in Obj0. Assume toward a contradiction that ρ does not
contain a good deviation point. Then by Definition 16 we know that for any prefix h of ρ,
any agent i 6= 0 such that Payoffi(ρ) = 0, and any strategy τi of i there exists σ1, · · · , σn
strategies for agents 1 to n such that the following holds:
[h] · Out
(
σh0 , σ
h
1 , · · · , τhi , · · · , σhn
)
6∈ Obji .
The above equation implies that Agent i does not have a profitable deviation under the
strategy σ0, hence the profile 〈σ0, · · · , σn〉 is a 0-fixed NE contradicting the fact that σ0 is a
solution for the NCRSP.
For the only if direction, let σ0 be a strategy for agent 0, assume that every ρ in Plays(σ0)
satisfies
1. ρ St∈ Obj0 or,
2. ρ has a good deviation.
If every play ρ in Plays(σ0) is in Obj0 then σ0 is a solution for NCRSP. Let ρ be a play in
Plays(σ0) such that it is not in Obj0. By assumption, ρ has a good deviation point i.e. there
exists an Agent i 6= 0 and a strategy τi for the same agent such that: i) ρ St 6∈ Obji and ii)
after a finite prefix h of ρ for any tuple of strategies (σj)j∈Agt\{0,i} the following holds:
[h] · Out
(
σh0 , σ
h
1 , · · · , τhi , · · · , σhn
)
∈ Obji .
Hence, ρ is not the outcome of a 0-fixed NE and therefore σ0 is a solution for the NCRSP. J
4.1 Correctness
I Definition 18. Eve wins if she has a strategy that ensures Obj against any strategy of
Adam.
I Proposition 19. If Eve wins then there exists a solution for the NCRSP.
Proof. Let σE be a winning strategy for Eve in H, and let σ0 be the strategy for Agent 0 in
G obtained by the construction in Sec. 3.4 Equation (4), that is, for every history h in G,
σ0(h) = σE(G2HσE (h))[0]. We show that σ0 is solution to the NCRSP.
Let ρ be an arbitrary run in G compatible with σ0.
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According to Lemma 17 it is sufficient to show that ρ is in Obj0 or ρ has a good deviation
point. Consider the run r = G2H•σE (ρ) in H. As a consequence of Claim 10, we have that r
is compatible with σE . Since σE is winning, we also have r ∈ Obj, i.e.,
r ∈ (S0 ∪ SD) ∩ SW = (S0 ∩ SW ) ∪ (SD ∩ SW ) .
As a first case, assume that r ∈ S0 ∩ SW implying π1(r QA) ∈ Obj0. By Claim 12 we can
write π1(r QA) = ρ St, and thus ρ St∈ Obj0.
As a second case, assume r ∈ SD ∩SW . It implies that there exists a state qa in QA along
r such that qa = (s,W,D) and there exists an agent i in D such that i in lim π3(r QA) and
π1(r QA) 6∈ Obji.
We argue that Agent i has a profitable deviation from a prefix of ρ entailing that ρ
contains a good deviation point.
Assume w.l.o.g. that qa is the first state along r for which there exists an Agent i in D
such that i in lim π3(r QA) and π1(r QA) 6∈ Obji. The run r is of the form:
r = h̃āpbb̄pcc̄pdd̄qat̃ (5)
where h̃ is a finite prefix of r ending in a state in QA, and t̃ is an infinite suffix. Remember
also that r = G2H•σE (ρ), hence there exists a history h which is a prefix of ρ such that
h̃ = G2H(h). We claim that h is a good deviation point (c.f. Definition 16) for Agent i.
Indeed, we use notation τi for the strategy defined only after h has occurred as follows:
τi(h) = c̄[i] where c̄ is the action available for agent i in Equation (5), and for any history
hh′ in G: τi(hh′) = σE(G2H(hh′))[i] . (Observe that by construction G2H(hh′) always ends
in a state in QA, controlled by Eve.)
We define the set T as the set of all the plays in G that start with h and are compatible
with τi. Let ρ′ be a play in T , and let r′ = G2H(ρ′) be a play in H. The play r′
enjoys two properties, first i ∈ lim π2(r′ QA) and second it is compatible with σE . Hence
π1(r′ QA) ∈ Obji. This shows that ρ has a good deviation point after history By Lemma 17
we conclude that σ0 is solution to the problem NCRSP. J
4.2 Completeness
I Proposition 20. There exists a solution for the NCRSP then Eve wins.
We first introduce some technical tools.
Deviator : Hist(σ0)× Agt→ Act ∪ {−}
(h, i) 7→
{
a if h is a good deviation point for Agent i using action a,
− if not.
Root : Hist× Agt→ Hist ∪ {⊥}
(h, i) 7→
{
h′ where h′ is the shortest prefix of h s.t. Deviator(h′, i) ∈ Act
⊥ if no such a prefix exists
I Claim 21. Let h be a history and i an agent s.t. Deviator(h, i) ∈ Act, then there exists a
winning strategy τi from Root(h, i) for agent i.
Indeed, assuming that Deviator(h, i) ∈ Act and that there is no winning strategy from
Root(h, i), would entail that Root(h, i) is not a good deviation point.
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Proof of Proposition 20. Let σ0 be a solution for the NCRSP. Given a history h̃ in H
s.t. Last(h̃) is in QA, we let h = H2G(h̃). We construct a strategy σE for Eve as follows:
σE(h̃) = ā such that ā[0] = σ0(h) and for every i in W, ā[i] = τi(h) where τi is the strategy
described by Claim 21. Notice that this strategy is only defined for histories h that satisfy
Root(h, i) 6= ⊥. This is ensured because i is in W , meaning that there exists a prefix h′ of h
such that h′ is a good deviation point for Agent i.
We also need to define σE for histories ending in a QC. Consider any history of the
form h̃āqbb̄qc, the strategy σE is defined as follows: σE(h̃āqbb̄qc) = c̄ such that for every i
not in W ∪D, c̄[i] = Deviator(h, i) Let us show that σE is winning for Eve. Let r be a run
compatible with σE . We must show that r ∈ (S0 ∪ SD) ∩ SW . Denote ρ = H2G•(r). By
Claim 14 we have π1(r QA) = ρ St.
If ρ St∈ Obj0 then r ∈ S0. If ρ St 6∈ Obj0, since σ0 is a solution, it follows that along ρ
some player has a good deviation point and is loosing. This entails that at some point i will
be in D along r i.e. Deviator(h̃, i) ∈ Act for some h̃ a prefix of r. Thus r ∈ SD.
It remains to show that r ∈ SW this follows from the facts that 1) any player in W is due
to the mapping Deviator that correctly guesses the correct deviations and 2) Claim 21. J
5 Computational Complexity
In this section, we take advantage of the construction presented in the previous section
to give complexity bounds for a variety of winning conditions. In fact, we can adapt the
technique used in [3] in order to establish the upper bound complexity for NCRSP.
In the case of Reachability, Safety, Büchi and coBüchi conditions, we reduce the game H
to a finite duration game. We actually tranform the winning condition into a finite horizon
condition in a finite duration game. In order to obtain this finite duration game, we simply
rewrite the winning objective of H and obtain a new game H′ with Parity objective. The
plays in the finite duration game Hf are obtained by stopping the plays in the game H′ after
the first loop.
In the remainder of this section, for technical convenience, we assume that the histories
in H are defined over the set Q∗ and that the plays are defined over Qω. This does not
affect the validity of the results since Tab′ is deterministic and the actions are encoded in
the states.
When the game H′ is equipped with a parity condition, we construct a finite duration
game that stops after the first loop. In particular, if Pr : St′ → N is the priority function in
H′. Then, the finite duration game Hf is defined over the same game structure as H′, but
each play stops after the first loop. We will consider such a play winning if the least parity
in the loop is even i.e a play r = xy1y2y3 . . . yly1 where x ∈ q0Q∗ and y1, y2, . . . , yl ∈ Q is
winning for Eve if min{Pr(yk) | 0 ≤ k ≤ l} is even.
The following lemma establishes the relation between H′ and Hf . It is actually a
consequence of a result that appeared in [1].
I Lemma 22. Eve has a winning strategy in the game H′ with the parity condition Pr if and
only if she has a winning strategy in the game Hf .
The following lemma establishes the fact that inside a cycle in the game H, the values of
the sets W and D do not change.
I Lemma 23. Let r be a play in H, and consider a loop along r. Let also q and q′ be two
states on this loop. We have π2(q) = π2(q′) and π3(q) = π3(q′).
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Proof. Let r = xqyqz be an infinite play in H. From the definition of the transition relation
in H, r′ = x(qy)ω is also a valid play in H. Then, assume towards contradiction that there
are two states in qy having different values on states W or D. It means that there is at least
one player i that is added or removed to/from W or D. Therefore, along r′ we would have an
infinite number of additions or removals to/from W or D. But, according to the transition
relation, this is not possible because once a player is removed from W , it is added to the
set D and never added to W again along r′. Also, once a player added in the set D, he is
never removed. Therefore, along each path, along each loop, the values of W and D do not
change. J
In order to check the condition of reachability, we keep along plays in the game H a set
P of players in the environment that already have visited their target states. Then, the
resulting game H′ has states in Q× 2Agt where Q is the set of states in the game H. The set
P is initially equal to the set of players for which the initial state is in their target set. Let
Ri ⊆ St be the target set of Player i. Then, P0 = {i | s0 ∈ Ri} and the initial state in the
resulting game H′ is (s0, ∅, ∅, P0).
The set P is updated as follows:
if (q, q′) ∈ Tab′ inH and q′ = (s,W,D) ∈ St×2Agt×2Agt, then ((q, P ), (q′, P∪{i | s ∈ Ri}))
is the corresponding transition in H′.
if (q, q′) ∈ Tab′ in H and q′ 6∈ St× 2Agt × 2Agt, then ((q, P ), (q′, P )) is the corresponding
transition in H′.
Note that the set P also eventually stabilizes since it only increases and there is a finite
number of players in G. Let lim π4(r QA) be the limit along the play r.
The objective of Eve in the game H is written in H′ as the Büchi condition Büchi(FR)
where:
FR = {(s,W,D, P ) | (0 ∈ P or D \ P 6= ∅) and (W ⊆ P )} .
Now, the Büchi objective Büchi(FR) can be expressed as the parity objective Parity(Pr)
with Pr(v) = 0 if v = (s,W,D, P ) ∈ FR and Pr(v) = 1 otherwise.
We now define the finite duration game Hf over the same game arena as H, but each play
stops when the first state in St× 2Agt× 2Agt× 2Agt is repeated. Then, each play is of the form
r = xy1y2y3 . . . yly1 where x ∈ q0(Q′)∗ and y1, y2, . . . , yl ∈ Q′ with Q′ = St×2Agt×2Agt×2Agt.
Eve wins in the game Hf if y1 = (s,W,D, P ) is such that (0 ∈ P or D\P 6= ∅) and (W ⊆ P ).
Equivalently, thanks to Lemma 23 and because the value of P does not change for the same
argument that showW andD eventually stabilize. Finally Eve wins if min{Pr(yk) | 0 ≤ j < l}
is even.
I Lemma 24. All plays in the game Hf have polynomial length in the size of the initial
game.
Proof. Since D and P are monotone, there are at most |Agt|+ 1 different values that they
can take on a path of H. Also, in the set W we can have at most one addition and one
removal for each player i ∈ Agt and hence 2|Agt| + 1 different values for W . Therefore,
along a play π there are at most r = 1 + (2|Agt|+ 1) · (|Agt|+ 1)2 · |St| different states in
St× 2Agt × 2Agt × 2Agt. Then, between two states in St× 2Agt × 2Agt × 2Agt, there are three
intermediate states. Therefore, since all the plays in Hf stop after the first cycle, the length
of each play is of at most 4r + 1 states since there is only one state that appears twice.
Therefore, all plays in Hf have polynomial length in Agt and St of the initial play G. J
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I Proposition 25. Deciding if there is a solution for the non-cooperative rational synthesis
in concurrent games with Reachability objectives is in PSpace.
Proof. Using Lemmas 22 and 24, solving the non-cooperative rational synthesis problem,
reduces to solving the finite duration game Hf which has polynomial length plays. This can
be done in PSpace using an alternating Turing machine runing in PTime. J
In the case of Safety, Büchi and coBüchi conditions, we essentially use similar constructions;
c.f. long version for full details on the constructions. Roughly speaking, in the case of safety
it sufficient to “dualize” the winning condition. In the cases of Büchi and coBüchi objectives,
the idea is to transform the game H by possibly adding some counters such that Eve’s
objective can be written as a parity objective. Note that these constructions are similar to
the ones in [3]. In the case of Muller conditions, we have to use Least Appearance Record
(LAR) construction to get the parity game H′ and then the finite duration game would
have plays with exponential length in the size of the initial game. This approach would give
ExpSpace complexity. Fortunately, the parity condition in the game H′ that we obtain after
applying the LAR construction has an exponential number of states but only a polynomial
number of priorities. Then, by using the result from [5, 8], we obtain ExpTime complexity.
I Theorem 26. Deciding if there is a solution for the non-cooperative rational synthesis
problem in concurrent games is in PSpace for Safety, Reachability, Büchi and co-Büchi
objectives and ExpTime for Muller objectives.
In the case of a fixed number of agents, the game H that we build has polynomial size in
the size of the initial game G (when considering that the transitions are given explicitly in
the table Tab since we build nodes in H for each possible action profile). This lowers the
complexities that we obtain for the rational synthesis problem. The theorem below holds
because the game H has polynomial size and Eve’s objective is fixed.
I Theorem 27. Deciding if there is a solution for the non-cooperative rational synthesis in
concurrent games with a fixed number of agents and Safety, Reachability, Büchi or co-Büchi
objectives is in PTime.
I Theorem 28. Deciding if there is a solution for the non-cooperative rational synthesis in
concurrent games with a fixed number of agents and Muller objectives is in PSpace.
6 Conclusions
In some circumstances, the Non Cooperative Rational Synthesis Problem (NCRSP) introduced
in [6] and defined here as Problem 6 might arguably accept undesired solutions. It asks
whether there is a strategy σ0 for Agent 0 such that for every 0-NE, if σ̄ = 〈σ0, σ̄−0〉, then
Payoff0(σ̄) = 1. One sees the objective of Agent 0 as a critical property satisfied by all
rational evolutions of the system. A possibly unwanted consequence is that a strategy σ0
which does not allow any rational evolution of the system, thus forcing anarchy, would be a
solution. The original definition of NCRSP can be strengthened so as to ask for a strategy
σ0 for Agent 0 such that there is at least one 0-NE. Another amendment can also restrict
the class of game structures. For instance, one can consider pseudo turn-based games, where
0-NE are certain to exist. It suffices to add in Definition 1 the constraint that in every state,
only Agent 0 and at most one other agent have non-vacuous choices. The games are still
concurrent. Agent 0 can still effectively control every state, but once her strategy σ0 is fixed,
the sub-game induced by σ0 has all the characteristics of a turn-based game, where there is
always a 0-NE.
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